1 Introduction "Competition among banks: good or bad?" has been a question raised for a long time. The general argument in favor of competition in any industry lies in its contributions to allocative, productive and dynamic e¢ciency (in the following, these e¤ects of competition will be referred as welfare e¤ects). However, for the banking industry, the answer is much less evident because of the delicate relationship between competition and stability.
From theoretical perspectives, competition may in ‡uence stability through both the liability and asset sides of banks' balance sheet. On the asset side, the classical thesis is that intense competition may worsen the excessive risk taking problem, a well-known moral hazard problem in banking. The intuition behind such argument is that greater competition erodes banks' franchise value, thus banks' failures are less costly. As a consequence, taking excessive risk becomes more attractive to banks. This result is shown within a framework, henceforth franchise-value framework, where, as a key assumption, the return distribution of banks' assets is exogenous and does not depend on the degree of competition in the banking sector. Such an assumption may be consistent if banks' activities are described as investments in di¤erent …nancial claims in the …nancial market. This, however, is not the case anymore, as pointed out by Boyd and DeNicolo (2005) , if we look at banks' lending activities. In the same spirit of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) , Boyd and DeNicolo (2005) found that the quality of banks' loans is improved if the loan rate decreases. Their …nal conclusion is a monotonically increasing link between competition and banks'
solvency.
Two important points may be drawn from the above considerations. First, the current literature portrays banks as passive lenders and ignores the role of banks in reducing information asymmetries. This approach is inconsistent with the intermediation theory which always claims the ability to monitor and to process information as the main speci…city of bank lending. Moreover, existing analysis on the nexus between banking competition and stability are performed without any connection to the debate on the welfare e¤ect of competition in the banking industry. We believe that such separation is not appropriate since an e¢cient bank should arguably be more resilient to negative shocks than an ine¢cient one. Hence, a more e¢cient banking industry is expected to be more stable.
This paper will address those two missing points by constructing a framework where the monitoring function of banks is taken into considerations. Speci…cally, we analyze a model where banks compete à la Cournot on both deposit and loan markets. On the deposit market, they compete to attract depositors. On the loan market, they compete to extend loans to …rms. Both relationships, namely depositors -banks and banks -…rms, are subject to moral hazard problems. The origin of moral hazard in the former is the system of deposit insurance with ‡at premium;
whereas, in the latter, moral hazard is due to the fact that loan returns depend on the hidden e¤ort of borrowers. Unlike depositors who are small households, banks, as sophisticated investors, can use costly monitoring to alleviate the information problem they face. In order to model monitoring, we adopt a continuous version of the formulation proposed by Holmström and Tirole (1997) . We assume that banks can choose a monitoring intensity and that a higher monitoring intensity will induce a more appropriate behavior of borrowers because it reduces the marginal cost of their e¤ort. Within such a setup, we investigate three questions: what are the e¤ects of competition on banks' monitoring incentives? Does competition hurt banks' stability? Which devices could be used to correct potential negative e¤ects of competition vis à vis …nancial stability?
For the …rst question, we …nd that the impact of competition on banks' monitoring incentives can be decomposed into two e¤ects. On the one hand, greater competition reduces loan margin and thus, makes monitoring less attractive to banks -monitoring-attractiveness e¤ect. On the other hand, since how much monitoring may improve the loan return distribution depends on the loan rate, competition also impacts the e¢ciency of monitoring activities -monitoring-e¢ciency e¤ect. While the …rst e¤ect clearly leads to the trade-o¤ between competition and stability, the direction of the second e¤ect is uncertain. If more intense competition does not involve any progression of the monitoring e¢ciency, the second e¤ect reinforces the …rst and the total e¤ect will be negative. We, however, show that there are situations where increasing competition does improve the e¢ciency of monitoring activities, and such improvement overweights the negative impact stemming from the reduction of loan margin. Hence, our analysis shows that the common presumption that market power increases banks' incentives to exert monitoring e¤ort is too simplistic. Furthermore, the monitoring-e¢ciency e¤ect arisen in our setup points out that there exists a real connection between the welfare e¤ect and the stability e¤ect of competition in the banking industry.
Regarding the second question, in our model, the quality of banks' loan portfolios is jointly determined by banks' and borrowers' behaviors. When competition increases, the loan rate will decrease, which induces the borrowers to exert more e¤ort. However, this e¤ect may be overweighted by the e¤ect of competition on banks' monitoring incentives. Greater competition will reduce banks' probability of failure if it raises monitoring incentives of banks. It should be pointed out that our setting encompasses the literature in the sense that we are able to produce some basic results in the literature as special cases.
Concerning the third question, we focus on the role of capital requirement. We extend our initial setup by assuming that banks have to hold some minimum capital bu¤er to support deposits they collect. In our framework, the cost of capital is assumed to be high enough so that the capital regulation is binding. We …nd that apart from a positive direct e¤ect on …nancial stability, the capital requirement has also indirect e¤ects which operate through its impact on interest rates. We distinguish two kinds of corrective e¤ects: weak correction vs. strong correction 1 , and claim that with the capital requirement, we can attain a weak correction but not strong correction.
The paper proceeds as follows. After reviewing the related literature in Section 1 See Section 5 for detailed de…nition.
2, we present the model in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to the characterization of the symmetric equilibrium. In Section 5, we examine the role of capital requirement in correcting negative e¤ects of competition vis à vis …nancial stability. In Section 6, we discuss some potential bene…ts of …nancial liberalization. Finally, Section 7 concludes with some remarks about future research directions.
Relation to the Literature
Our paper belongs to the theoretical literature analyzing the ties between competition and banks' risk-taking incentives. As we have mentioned in the introduction, there exist two strands within this literature.
The …rst and earliest strand was pioneered by Keeley (1990) and then successively followed by, among others, Allen and Gale (2000) , Hellman et al. (2000), Matutes and Vives (2000) , Cordella and Yeyati (2002) , Repullo (2004) . A common feature of these papers is that they use the franchise-value framework to address the e¤ects of competition on risk -taking incentives of banks. This framework is characterized by the fact that banking competition is explicitly modeled only on the liability side. On the asset side, banks' asset allocation decisions are modeled as a "portfolio allocation problem" and then, banks' asset return does not depend on the degree of competition. Within this setup, greater competition implies an increase in the deposit rate and thus, reduces banks' charter values. Keeping in mind that charter values represent the cost of failure for banks, these papers conclude that more competition results in higher incentives for banks to take risks. Some of the above papers also investigate the e¢ciency of di¤erent regulatory tools in limiting perverse impacts of competition on risk -taking. For instance, Matutes and Vives (2000) consider the role of deposit regulation (rate regulation or deposit limits), and …nd that this instrument is su¢cient to implement the welfare -optimal policy when the deposit insurance scheme is risk-sensitive. However, with a ‡at-premium deposit insurance, a deposit regulation may need to be combined with direct asset restrictions to improve welfare. Cordella and Yeyati (2002) focus on the e¤ects of information disclosure and deposit insurance scheme. They …nd that both are likely to mitigate adverse e¤ects of competition.
The second strand includes two papers: Boyd and DeNicolo (2005) ; MartinezMiera and Repullo (2008) . These papers di¤erentiate themselves from the …rst strand by the fact that they explicitly take into consideration the lenders -borrowers relationship on the asset side of banks' balance sheet. This feature has two implications. First, banks' asset returns depend on the competitiveness of the banking industry through the loan rate. Second, the riskiness of banks' assets also depends on borrowers' behaviors. Boyd and DeNicolo (2005) …nd that the risk level of banks' assets is monotonically decreasing with the number of banks. The intuition of their result is as follows: when competition increases, the loan rate will decrease, which induces borrowers to choose safer investments. Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2008) deviate from Boyd and DeNicolo (2005) by assuming that loan returns are imperfectly correlated. In that case, a decrease of the loan rate reduces performances of non-defaulting loans which provide a bu¤er to cover loan losses. The authors show that when that e¤ect of competition, called there margin e¤ect, is taken into account, a U-shaped relationship between competition and the risk of bank failure generally obtains.
Our paper introduces the role of banks as monitors into the second strand. Hence, we get a more complete and appropriate description of bank-lending activities. To the best of our knowledge, only Caminal and Matutes (2002) 
The Model
We consider an economy with two dates (t = 0; 1) and a banking industry composed of N commercial banks indexed by i = 1; 2; :::; N . These banks compete à la
Cournot to collect deposits from depositors and to extend loans to entrepreneurs.
A. Deposit Market
Banks have no capital 2 and are funded by deposits at date 0. They face an upward sloping supply of deposits which is represented by an inverse supply curve
Denote by D i the amount of deposits collected by bank i. We assume that deposits are fully insured, which implies that the deposit supply does not depend on risk. Hence, the deposit interest rate is only a function of total deposits
In our judgment, the assumption of deposit insurance best re ‡ects the reality. In most countries of the world, there exists either explicitly or implicitly a system of deposit insurance. We assume that the deposit insurance premium is ‡at and, for expositional purposes, it is normalized to zero 3 2 We will relax this assumption later. 3 All our results are still valid if the ‡at premium is strictly positive.
Assumption 1
The inverse deposit supply function r D (:) satis…es
On the loan market, there is a population of risk-neutral and penniless entrepreneurs. Each entrepreneur has access to a project that requires one unit of investment at date 0 and yields at date 1 a stochastic cash ‡owR. We assume thatR can take two valuesR
R with probability p 0 with probability 1 p
The distribution of the cash ‡owR depends on the e¤ort of the entrepreneur, i.e.
how diligently the project is managed. We measure this e¤ort by the probability of success p 2 [0; 1] of the project: by carefully running the project, the entrepreneur can improve the likelihood of getting a high return. The cost of being diligent corresponds to the sacri…ce of some private bene…ts, which can be thought of as a quiet life, managerial perks or diversion of corporate revenues for private use.
To fund his project, the entrepreneur must borrow from banks 4 . This borrowing relationship is subject to a moral hazard problem because the bank cannot directly observe the entrepreneur's e¤ort. However, the bank can use monitoring activities to induce the appropriate behavior of their borrowers. In practice, bank's monitoring amounts to verifying whether borrowers comply with restrictive covenants and to enforcing the covenants if they do not. Hence, as noted by Holmström and Tirole (1997) , monitoring may reduce borrowers' opportunity cost of being diligent 5 . In order to formalize this idea, we assume that the private bene…ts the entrepreneur may enjoy depend on how intensively the bank monitors the project's running.
Let m i 2 [0; 1] denote the monitoring intensity chosen by bank i for each unit of loan. Therefore, in our model, the entrepreneur's private bene…ts are a function of two variables, namely p and m. Denote it by B(p; m). We make the following assumptions on the function B(:; :). From now on, for convenience of notation, we use subscripts to refer to partial derivatives.
Assumption 2 The entrepreneur's private bene…t function B(:; :) satis…es
The entrepreneur's private bene…ts are then a decreasing and concave function of his e¤ort (part (i)). Since in our model the cost of e¤ort for the entrepreneur is modeled by some reduction in his private bene…ts, the negative of B p (p; m) can be interpreted as the marginal cost of e¤ort. Thus, a positive sign of the cross-partial derivative B pm (part (ii)) means that a higher monitoring intensity makes e¤ort less costly marginally. This property is crucial for the usefulness of monitoring in this paper. Part (iii) of the assumption serves to rule out corner solutions.
Monitoring is costly for banks, which introduces another incentive problem concerning banks. We represent the monitoring cost corresponding to the monitoring intensity m by a twice di¤erentiable function C(m) 6 . We assume that the monitoring cost function is increasing, convex and, to insure interior solutions, satis…es two additional conditions:
Assumption 3 The monitoring cost function C(:) satis…es Regarding the competition between banks to grant loans, similarly to the case of the deposit market, we adopt a Cournot formulation. Hence, given a loan supply L i of each bank i, the interest rate charged for each unit of loan will be determined
Note that since deposits are the only source of funds for banks, the balance sheet identity implies that
To insure that all parties get a positive surplus when the investment project succeeds, we impose an additional assumption:
The timing of the model is as follows. At date 0, all banks simultaneously determine the amount of deposits collected and the volume of loans extended to entrepreneurs. Then, each bank i chooses the monitoring intensity m i and each entrepreneur chooses the e¤ort level p. At date 1, project returns are realized and payments are settled. Figure 1 summarizes this timing.
Before going to the characterization of the equilibrium, some further remarks are useful. First, in our model, by monitoring, banks can reduce the extent of the moral hazard problem but they cannot completely eliminate it. In other words, our monitoring technology is imperfect and its e¢ciency is determined, as we will see below, endogenously. Second, in our setting, the quality of loan portfolios, i.e. banks' assets, depends on the behaviors of both parties in the borrowing relationship and neither banks nor entrepreneurs can have complete control over it. We believe that this feature best re ‡ects the real, complex …nancial environment where incessant innovation not only provides participants with numerous means to better manage their investment, but also exposes them to more risk of control loss. From theoretical perspectives, this remark makes sense when we notice that two existing frameworks in the literature assume full control either of banks or of entrepreneurs over the riskiness of banks' assets.
Symmetric Equilibrium
To solve for the equilibrium, we …rst determine the e¤ort level the entrepreneur will choose when facing a loan rate r L and a monitoring intensity m. We then analyze the bank's choice of monitoring intensity. The equilibrium's characterization will be complete by …nding the equilibrium deposit and loan rates.
Entrepreneurs' e¤ort level p
Given a loan rate r L and a monitoring intensity m, each entrepreneur will choose p to maximize his expected pro…t, including the private bene…ts:
Note that due to Assumption 2, the entrepreneur's pro…t function is concave with respect to p and no corner solutions exist. Hence, the solution is characterized by the following …rst-order condition (FOC):
Denote the solution to equation (2) by p (r L ; m). Using implicit di¤erentiation, we
and
Hence, (3) implies that a decrease in the interest rate on loans will help inducing the entrepreneur to exert a higher e¤ort 8 . Moreover, from (4) 
Bank's monitoring intensity m
We now turn to the monitoring incentives of banks. For given D i and D i , the expected pro…t of each bank i can be computed as 9 :
When writing the bank's pro…t function, we make two assumptions:
First, we assume that loans' returns are perfectly correlated. As noted by Allen and Gale (2000) , perfect correlation of loans is equivalent to assuming that the risk associated with each loan can be decomposed into systemic and idiosyncratic components, and that with a large number of entrepreneurs, the idiosyncratic component can be perfectly diversi…ed away. Moreover, although perfect correlation is an extreme case 10 , some degree of correlation is necessary to provide a role for 8 Similarly with the e¤ect identi…ed in Boyd and DeNicolo (2005) . 9 For notational simplicity, in situations where there is no risk of confusion, we will write loan and deposit rates simply as r L and r D suppressing the fact that they depend on respectively total loans and total deposits.
10 Martinez -Miera and Repullo (2008) study the case of imperfect correlation in a setting without monitoring in our setup.
Second, the total monitoring costs are assumed to be proportional to the number of loans to be monitored 11 . Put di¤erently, we assume that the bank has resources to monitor an arbitrary large number of projects. This assumption implies that the size of the loan portfolio will not a¤ect the choice of monitoring intensity by the bank. Whereby we abstract from the problem of the link between the bank's size and the monitoring incentives 12 .
The problem for bank i is to determine the monitoring intensity that maximizes his pro…t:
Since B i is a continuous function, it has a maximum on the feasible set [0; 1]. In addition, due to the part (ii) of Assumption 3, corner solutions are excluded.
Therefore, the solution of the above optimization problem satis…es:
Equation (5) clari…es the trade-o¤ the bank faces when raising monitoring intensity. That is, the trade-o¤ between a higher cost of monitoring and a higher probability that loans will pay o¤.
Let m i be the optimal monitoring intensity chosen by bank i. It is clear from equation (5) 12 See, for example, Cerasi and Daltung (2000) for the analysis of the optimal size of a bank.
(6) is strict, we obtain
Because of (4) and the second order condition (6), we see that the partial derivative of m i with respect to r D is negative. Hence, an increase in the deposit rate reduces the bank's monitoring incentives, which is exactly the standard e¤ect of deposit competition found in the literature. Concerning the e¤ects of the loan rate, we have
Therefore apart from a similar e¤ect as the deposit rate, the loan rate has another e¤ect on the monitoring intensity, represented by the cross-partial derivative p m i r L .
This term can be negative or positive, depending on the properties of the private bene…t function B(p; m). We will discuss this in more detail in the next section.
The main message here is that while increasing competition on the deposit market can only have a negative e¤ect on monitoring incentives, increasing competition on the loan market may have a positive e¤ect. This suggests that competition on the deposit market and on the loan market should be treated in di¤erent ways by policy makers.
Equilibrium interest rates
We are now in a position to determine the equilibrium deposit and loan rates. M ax
where
f (Z) represents the expected return of an individual loan. The maximization program (9) becomes M ax
In what follows, we are going to assume that functional forms and parameter values are such that f 0 (0) < 0 and f 00 (:) 0. Therefore, the symmetric equilibrium, where all banks choose the same amount of deposits D and so the total volume of deposits, Z = N D , is characterized by the following equation:
Lemma 1 In the symmetric equilibrium, the total volume of deposits (and also of loans) is increasing with the number of banks.
Proof. By totally di¤erentiating (10), we have
which is positive since f 0 (:) < 0 and f 00 (:) < 0.
Lemma 1 states a standard result of increasing competition in a Cournot model.
It implies that higher competition increases the deposit rate and decreases the loan rate.
We are now equipped to explore how the competitiveness of the banking industry a¤ects banks' monitoring incentives and banks' failure probability. We measure the intensity of competition by the number of banks. In equilibrium, all banks choose the same monitoring intensity equal to m (r L (Z ) ; r D (Z )). We have
Since Z is an increasing function of N , dm dN has the same sign as dm dZ
. Using (7) and (8), we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The e¤ect of competition on the monitoring intensity chosen by banks is given by the sign of
Hence, competition impacts banks' monitoring incentives through two channels:
First, more competition leads to a lower loan margin. Keeping in mind that, for banks, monitoring serves to decrease the probability of loans defaults, this …rst e¤ect makes monitoring less attractive to banks, and thus unambiguously reduces their incentives -the monitoring-attractiveness e¤ect. In (11), this e¤ect corresponds to the second component of the numerator. Clearly, its sign is negative and, since the denominator is negative, this term will tend to induce a decreasing relationship between N and m , which may re ‡ect the common presumption that market power increases banks' incentives for monitoring.
Competition, however, has another e¤ect on the monitoring intensity chosen by banks, which is represented by the …rst term in the numerator of (11). Such e¤ect 
In such case, increasing competition will lead to an improvement in the e¢ciency of banks' monitoring activities if the following condition holds
This condition is equivalent to the function ln h 0 (p) being concave 14 on the in-
Therefore, when condition (A) does not hold, the monitoring-e¢ciency e¤ect reinforces the monitoring-attractiveness e¤ect, which implies that higher competition will hurt banks' monitoring incentives. When condition (A) is satis…ed, the two effects of competition on monitoring intensity go in opposite directions. The su¢cient condition for a positive relationship between competition and monitoring incentives is the following
13 Assumption 2 on the function B(:; :) is translated into the assumption that the function h(:) is decreasing and concave with h 0 (0) = 0 and h 0 (1) = 1, and that the function g(:) is decreasing. 14 h 0 (p) is then said to be a logarithmically concave function on the interval [0; 1].
15 Compared to condition (A), this condition means that the function ln h 0 (p) must be su¢-ciently concave.
Regarding banks' failure, the equilibrium solvency probability for banks is p (r L (Z ); m (Z )) :
The …rst term in the parenthesis of (13) (ii) If condition (B) holds, the intensity of monitoring by banks increases with the number of banks (N ) and so, higher competition will make banks safer.
Proof. See appendix.
An interesting point is worth noting here. It relates to the connection between welfare e¤ect and stability e¤ect of competition in the banking industry. So far, these two e¤ects are usually considered separately and, to the best of our knowledge, no studies point out their probable relationship. The new e¤ect of competition on banks' monitoring incentive found in this paper -monitoring-e¢ciency e¤ect -sheds some light on this problem. In the banking industry, as in any other industry 16 , competitive pressure is believed to push …rms to look for the most e¢cient way to organize their operations. This is the productive e¢ciency bene…t, one of three welfare bene…ts frequently claimed to be associated with competition. In this sense, increasing competition is expected to be accompanied by a more e¢cient monitoring technology, which is bene…cial to the stability. This argument illustrates the view that if banks are strengthened by the forces of competition, the banking system will be stronger and more resilient.
All in all, both e¤ects on monitoring found in our paper are likely to be present in practice. When the banking sector is highly concentrated, the e¢ciency -improving e¤ect of increasing competitive pressure is likely to be greater than the opposite e¤ect of loan margin reduction. When in the banking market, there is already a great deal of competition, all options to improve e¢ciency are exhausted, increasing competition would result more in a reduction of loan margin than in an advance of e¢ciency. Therefore, part (ii) of Proposition (2) is more likely to occur when N is small, whereas part (i) is more probable when N is already high. This suggests that the relationship between competition and fragility may be in a U-shaped.
Special Cases
In this section, we highlight how some basic results in the literature can be obtained in our setup and, thus, shed some light on the role of alternative assumptions.
First of all, let us see what happens if we assume, as in the franchise-value framework, that the return on banks' assets is independent of the degree of competition.
Our setup can be then restated shortly as follows: N banks compete to collect funds from depositors and invest the proceeds in loans. Each unit of loans pays some exogenous return r L in case of success and 0 in case of failure. The loans' probability of success depends on the monitoring intensity chosen privately by banks. With the independence of loans' return, competition a¤ects banks' asset quality only through the deposit rate: in (11), by replacing r 0 L (Z ) = 0, we get dm dN < 0. Hence, greater competition unambiguously induces worse behaviors of banks. This in turn implies in (13) that the banks' solvency probability is lower the higher competition is. That is exactly the famous trade -o¤ between competition and stability. Now, we turn to Boyd and DeNicolo's setup where banks are treated as passive lenders. They don't have any instruments to mitigate the moral hazard problem present in their relationship with borrowers. One way to get rid of monitoring in our model is to assume that the cross -partial derivative B pm of the private bene…t function is non positive. Such an assumption implies, as seen in (4), that monitoring does not have any disciplinary e¤ect. In other words, monitoring technology becomes useless and thus, in equilibrium, banks choose a null monitoring intensity (see (5)).
Without monitoring, the banks' solvency probability is monotonically increasing with the number of banks, as (13) indicates. Therefore, with passive banks and a
Cournot competition paradigm as Boyd and DeNicolo (2005) , all e¤ects of deposit competition on the banks' asset quality are ignored.
To summarize, two existing frameworks in the literature, namely the franchisevalue framework and the Boyd-DeNicolo (2005)'s setup, are two extreme cases of our setting. In each of these cases, there are always some e¤ects found in our model that are missing.
Capital Requirement as Corrective Device
As the analysis in previous section has shown, the view that competition is unambiguously good or bad for the stability of banking system is too simplistic. The impact of competition on …nancial fragility can be very complex. Therefore, a more balanced policy approach with respect to banking competition, we believe, would be to …nd di¤erent methods to correct its negative e¤ects and promote the positive ones. We distinguish two kinds of corrective e¤ects: Weak correction refers to compensation for perverse consequences of competition. Strong correction corresponds to a change in the sign of the relationship between competition and stability.
Consistently with the growing role of capital requirement in prudential supervision, we examine in this section the e¤ectiveness of this regulation to remedy perverse impacts of competition. In order to do that, we introduce capital regulation into the model of Section 3. We assume that banks must invest some of their own capital to support the deposits they mobilize. Let k i denote the capital invested by bank i, expressed as a fraction of deposits mobilized. By regulation, k i must be greater or equal to some minimum capital requirement k. The opportunity cost of capital is . We assume that is high enough so that banks will not hold any excess capital (i.e. k i = k) 17 . The view that the opportunity cost of banks'capital is high is relevant because, otherwise, the moral hazard problem in banking could be solved easily. Regulators would simply require banks to hold su¢cient capital and banks would willingly comply.
Since the entrepreneurs' behavior when facing a loan rate r L and a monitoring intensity m is the same as in our initial model, the solvency probability of each bank i still equals p (r L ; m i ). Its total loans L i equal (1 + k)D i and its pro…t can be written as follows 18 :
The optimal monitoring intensity chosen by bank i is now the solution to the following condition 19 :
Hence, besides the two interest rates, the optimal monitoring intensity, denoted now by m C i , is also directly in ‡uenced by the level of capital requirement. This direct e¤ect of capital requirement on monitoring incentives can be determined as follows:
17 This is equivalent to the assumption that is su¢ciently higher than r L (0). The same assumption is made in Hellmann et al. (2000) . 18 The superscript "CB" refers to capitalized banks. 19 The associated second order condition is
From (14), we get
which means that a higher capital requirement has a positive direct e¤ect on monitoring. The intuition for this positive e¤ect is that the banks' capital acts as a bu¤er against risk. When banks invest more their own capital, they have to bear more downside risk, which incites them to behave more appropriately.
However, this is not the whole story yet. Variations of the capital requirement also bring about changes to the equilibrium interest rates 20 . Overall e¤ects of the capital requirement on monitoring then depend on the relationship between loan and deposit rates and monitoring incentives. Note that imposing a capital requirement can be seen as imposing an additional cost for deposits 21 . Consequently, when banks' capital is scarce, an increase in the capital requirement may reduce the available amount of deposits and loans in the banking sector, which leads the deposit rate to decrease and the loan rate to increase. If such a scenario happens, increasing the capital requirement may act as a countervailing force to an increase in competition, which lessens the decrease of loan margins caused by greater competition. Using the terminology proposed above, by increasing the capital requirement, we can obtain a weak correction e¤ect.
Is a strong correction also accessible through an increase in the capital requirement? The answer is provided by the following proposition.
Proposition 3 In the presence of the capital requirement, the e¤ect of competition 20 Indeed, with capital requirement, the total deposits Z C in the symmetric equilibrium are determined by f
C is function of both N and k, which implies that r L and r D also depend on k. 21 Without capital requirement, expected cost for one unit of deposit is pr D . With capital requirement k, this expected cost becomes
on the monitoring intensity chosen by banks is given by:
Proof. Implicitly di¤erentiating equation (14) with respect to N , keeping in mind that r L and r D are function of Z C , immediately yields (15).
In Proposition 2, we see that when condition (A) does not hold (i.e. p mr L (:; :) > 0), there is a negative link between monitoring intensity and the degree of competition in the banking market. In that case, the sign of (15) This last conclusion is very encouraging with respect to the e¢ciency e¤ect found in our paper. The same upgrade of e¢ciency is reported in Shyu (1998) for the Taiwanese banking system as well as in Bhattacharya et al. (1997) for the liberalization process in India.
Second, a market enlargement typically accompanies …nancial liberalization. As
Vives (2001) Here, we want to attract attention to its consequences for the elasticity of deposits supply and loans demand which appear in our condition (B) that we proved to be su¢cient for a positive relationship between competition and stability.
Concluding Remarks
This paper o¤ers an analysis of the desirability of competition in the banking industry. The main distinctive point of our study consists in bringing up the monitoring function of banks in the lending relationship with borrowers and then, investigating the impact of competition on the banks' stability through its impact on monitoring incentives. We reveal two possible e¤ects of competition on monitoring: attractiveness and e¢ciency e¤ects. We also identify the su¢cient condition under which greater competition will increase monitoring incentives as well as the banks' stability. When it comes to policy matters, we consider the role of capital requirement as a corrective device and show that with a capital requirement, one can obtain a weak correction but a not strong one.
To keep our analysis tractable, we have made some simplifying assumptions. We here wish to have some more detailed discussion about them. First, in our setup, we choose Cournot paradigm to model the competition between banks. The appropriateness of this paradigm in modeling the competitive behaviors of banks seems to be questioned by the literature examining banking competition under asymmetric information. The main objective of this literature is to study how informational asymmetries among banks a¤ect competitive outcomes. More speci…cally, papers belonging to this literature are interested in characterizing the equilibria emerging in a loan market, where banks can use imperfect screening tests to assess the ability of potential borrowers to repay and they compete to …x the interest rate. Broecker (1990) shows that within such a setup, even in the limit, there is always some degree of oligopolistic competition, which contrasts with the …ndings of classical competition settings. Gehrig (1998) …nds that market integration does not necessarily leads to more competitive outcomes in the loan market. More surprisingly, Marquez (2002) obtains that increasing the number of banks may push the loan rate up as it leads to less e¢cient screening by banks. Hauswald and Marquez (2006) show that this result would be reversed if information acquisition is endogenous. These considerations suggest that trying to construct a more adequate framework to model banking competition may be an interesting agenda for future research. However, we would also like to note that as long as more competition leads to lower loan rate and higher deposit rate -a likely outcome observed in practice, all our qualitative conclusions will hold.
Another remark concerns the fact that in this paper as well as in all other papers in the literature, the banks' size did not play any role. However, it seems that the role of size in the banking industry is an important issue for at least two reasons.
First, the moral hazard problem is more severe in big banks than in small banks due to "too big to fail" e¤ects. Second, it is much more challenging to supervise a large bank with very complex organization and where the risk of regulatory capture is more likely to be present. These two reasons can lead to criticizing the view that market power could promote …nancial stability. We leave this question to future research.
Now we turn to (ii): the fact that the numerator of (11) 
